Today, the Federal Reserve announced a new round of stress tests for the six largest American banks to find out how well they would withstand a market discombobulation emanating from the EU sovereign debt crisis. Translated from regulatory speak to plain English, this is a strong hint to the big banks that they straightaway ditch as much of their EU exposure as they possibly can, devil take the hindmost. Those banks that don't move with alacrity will be required to boost capital levels, an exercise detested by bonus loving bank executives (which would be about all of them).
It is ironic that the Fed would try to quietly build a firewall around the U.S. banking system. It has preached internationalism throughout the past four years as the financial markets belly flopped, and maintains generous dollar-denominated lines of credit to foreign central banks. The latter measure helps the dollar fulfill its role as the world's reserve currency, ensuring that there are enough dollars for the wheels of commerce. But encouraging major U.S. banks to offload Euro-denominated obligations de-globalizes. In effect, the Fed is saying, "Lafayette, nous allons partir."
Euro-denominated investments will face downward price pressure if U.S. banks begin casting them away. The Fed surely knows this would be bad for the EU's banking system, which is desperately reaching for any lifeline in turbulent seas. One can't help but wonder whether the Fed has concluded that the EU may not be able to pull itself out of its nosedive.
Showing posts with label bank capital. Show all posts
Showing posts with label bank capital. Show all posts
Tuesday, November 22, 2011
Monday, October 17, 2011
Will Customer Fee Increases Hurt the Big Banks?
Recent bank fee increases are pushing consumer funds to credit unions and other financial firms. (See http://www.cnbc.com/id/44930883.) This is understandable from the consumers' standpoint. Why enrich banks when you're barely making ends meet? A less obvious question is whether these fee increases are bad for banks.
Banks play a potentially dangerous game. They make medium and long term loans and investments, using short term money (i.e., money that can be withdrawn quickly). Because short term deposits and other borrowings tend to cost banks less in interest expense than medium and long term loans generate in interest income, banks make profits on the difference. This game works fine as long as the short term depositors and other creditors of banks don't bolt. But, as we all know from recent financial upheavals, a run on the bank results muy pronto in its collapse--unless it's so big that the government steps in and gives the bank a blank check drawn on taxpayers.
Consumer deposits tend to be stable. This is true even for nominally short term accounts, such as checking accounts that theoretically can be closed on demand. It's a hassle for consumers to change banks, especially now that they often have direct deposits made to their accounts and direct bill paying from their accounts. The banks that have been raising fees are betting that a lot of customers will find it too bothersome to switch accounts, and will cough up $5 a month for a debit card or whatever.
But many customers may leave, particularly after a few months or maybe many months. While the banks will probably profit short term by raising fees, after a while growing numbers of customers may tire of paying for what's free elsewhere. If banks see a shrinkage in their retail deposit base, what will they do? They can either reduce their balance sheets (i.e., reduce the loans and investments they hold) or they can seek alternative funding. Banks, as a rule, don't shrink their balance sheets. If you're a bank CEO, you aren't likely to perceive a lot of benefit to making your organization smaller. The more assets the bank holds, the more profits it will hopefully make and the larger your bonus will hopefully get.
Since banks losing consumer business won't be inclined to shrink their balance sheets, they will seek alternative funding. The choices are likely to be much less stable than consumer deposits. Typical alternatives would include the fed funds market, the commercial paper market and the repo market. Funding from these markets is susceptible to great instability. Money a bank borrows in these markets can evaporate faster than a hedge fund can execute a computerized trade.
Europe's big banks are funded to a large degree in wholesale markets, more so than many of America's big banks, and are consequently less stable. That's one reason why the EU sovereign debt crisis became so acute so fast earlier this year--the money market vigilantes fled the big EU banks, and Europe's governments had to ride to the rescue. (If you have an account with a U.S. money market fund, though, your fund may have been one of these vigilantes and you'd probably consider this a good thing.)
If America's big banks experience a large enough shift in their liabilities, with less retail deposits and more wholesale funding, their risk profiles could change and not in a good way. Are bank executives are concerned? Come on. If a big bank goes way out on a limb and the limb starts to break, the Federal Reserve will climb into its Black Hawks and helicopter to the rescue. But taxpayers should be concerned. If America's big bank risk profiles tilt toward the European model, the potential for bailouts increases.
The risks of reliance on wholesale funding are well-illustrated by Lehman Brothers' collapse in 2008. When the word got around the Lehman was struggling, its funding dried up faster than rich people rushed out of New Orleans as Hurricane Katrina approached. That one time, the Fed and the Treasury Department didn't deliver a bailout by courier. They've been harshly criticized ever since. So you can bet your bippy that no large bank will ever again be allowed to fail. Period. That's why, long term, it might end up being a bad thing if consumer deposits leave big banks. Regulators should require more capital as banks' risk profiles become hinkier. Then again, a lot of things that should be done aren't.
Banks play a potentially dangerous game. They make medium and long term loans and investments, using short term money (i.e., money that can be withdrawn quickly). Because short term deposits and other borrowings tend to cost banks less in interest expense than medium and long term loans generate in interest income, banks make profits on the difference. This game works fine as long as the short term depositors and other creditors of banks don't bolt. But, as we all know from recent financial upheavals, a run on the bank results muy pronto in its collapse--unless it's so big that the government steps in and gives the bank a blank check drawn on taxpayers.
Consumer deposits tend to be stable. This is true even for nominally short term accounts, such as checking accounts that theoretically can be closed on demand. It's a hassle for consumers to change banks, especially now that they often have direct deposits made to their accounts and direct bill paying from their accounts. The banks that have been raising fees are betting that a lot of customers will find it too bothersome to switch accounts, and will cough up $5 a month for a debit card or whatever.
But many customers may leave, particularly after a few months or maybe many months. While the banks will probably profit short term by raising fees, after a while growing numbers of customers may tire of paying for what's free elsewhere. If banks see a shrinkage in their retail deposit base, what will they do? They can either reduce their balance sheets (i.e., reduce the loans and investments they hold) or they can seek alternative funding. Banks, as a rule, don't shrink their balance sheets. If you're a bank CEO, you aren't likely to perceive a lot of benefit to making your organization smaller. The more assets the bank holds, the more profits it will hopefully make and the larger your bonus will hopefully get.
Since banks losing consumer business won't be inclined to shrink their balance sheets, they will seek alternative funding. The choices are likely to be much less stable than consumer deposits. Typical alternatives would include the fed funds market, the commercial paper market and the repo market. Funding from these markets is susceptible to great instability. Money a bank borrows in these markets can evaporate faster than a hedge fund can execute a computerized trade.
Europe's big banks are funded to a large degree in wholesale markets, more so than many of America's big banks, and are consequently less stable. That's one reason why the EU sovereign debt crisis became so acute so fast earlier this year--the money market vigilantes fled the big EU banks, and Europe's governments had to ride to the rescue. (If you have an account with a U.S. money market fund, though, your fund may have been one of these vigilantes and you'd probably consider this a good thing.)
If America's big banks experience a large enough shift in their liabilities, with less retail deposits and more wholesale funding, their risk profiles could change and not in a good way. Are bank executives are concerned? Come on. If a big bank goes way out on a limb and the limb starts to break, the Federal Reserve will climb into its Black Hawks and helicopter to the rescue. But taxpayers should be concerned. If America's big bank risk profiles tilt toward the European model, the potential for bailouts increases.
The risks of reliance on wholesale funding are well-illustrated by Lehman Brothers' collapse in 2008. When the word got around the Lehman was struggling, its funding dried up faster than rich people rushed out of New Orleans as Hurricane Katrina approached. That one time, the Fed and the Treasury Department didn't deliver a bailout by courier. They've been harshly criticized ever since. So you can bet your bippy that no large bank will ever again be allowed to fail. Period. That's why, long term, it might end up being a bad thing if consumer deposits leave big banks. Regulators should require more capital as banks' risk profiles become hinkier. Then again, a lot of things that should be done aren't.
Thursday, September 15, 2011
The UBS $2 Billion Loss: This and the Banks Want Easy Capital Standards?
Here we go again. Another big bank, this time UBS AG, reports an elephantine loss attributed to unauthorized trading. In this instance, the big boo boo was allegedly made by a derivatives trader identified in the press as Kweku Adoboli. It seems just like yesterday that Societe Generale 'fessed up to a $6.7 billion loss from its own rogue trader, Jerome Kerviel. Then, there was Nick Leeson at Barings bank, Yasuo Hamanaka at Sumitomo Trust, and John Rusnak at Allied Irish, among others, who have attained notoriety for generating leviathan trading losses. The big banks just don't seem to move up the learning curve when it comes to risk management.
It's no surprise that both the UBS mess and the preceding scandals involved lightly regulated markets. Bad behavior is always more likely when there are few hall monitors. But the banks themselves have the primary obligation to watch over their people and preserve their assets. They keep failing.
One has to wonder if the inevitability of government support makes it easier for bank executives to short sheet the risk management budget. Top management knows that no matter how massive losses get, the government will not allow a major bank to fail. Experience teaches that top management will generally not suffer much from one of these financial tectonic events. Some embarrassment, yes, and perhaps a modest haircut off one's bonus. But loss of employment and legal sanctions seem to be out of the question. So, why invest large sums in risk management systems when that would only reduce the amount of net income used to determine executive bonuses?
In addition, truly effective risk management would likely mean lower levels of risk taken. That would probably reduce income. It would also reduce losses. But management compensation tends not to be diminished as much by losses as it is leveraged by gains. So top executives are incentivized to take risks, and collecting outsized gains if the risks pay off. And if the risks fry the bank's butt? That would be a shame for shareholders.
Risk management is not just a problem for trading. One sees weak risk management in recent mortgage-related problems. Alleged poor underwriting standards for mortgage-backed securities may cost some big banks tens of billions each. The robo-signing foreclosure scandal will cost yet billions more.
And then there's Europe's sovereign debt crisis. Europe's major banks were the doofusses that financed the profligacy of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, et al. How the . . . heck . . . did they manage to put the world's financial system and economy at the edge of the abyss? Didn't they have controls that suggested diversification--not exactly a novel concept--might be in order?
For the past half-decade or more now, the world's largest banks have repeatedly imperiled prosperity worldwide. At the same time, they are coddled with bailouts, subsidies, and explicit and implicit government guarantees. Yesterday's announcement by Germany and France of support for Greece, and today's announcement by the Fed and other major central banks offering emergency dollar loans to Europe's commercial banks, are just the latest in a long line of handouts. Europe's banks have been facing growing customer runs, and more government munificence was deemed appropriate. Banks are like kids that never lose a soccer game, no matter how far behind they fall. No wonder they don't act maturely.
The regulators' proposal to end this cycle of wealth transfer from taxpayers to bank executives has been to raise capital standards. The so-called Basel III standards, which are in the process of being implemented, may require major banks to more than double the amounts of capital they hold, compared to the ineffectual Basel II standards. Banks are pushing back as vigorously as they can. Increasing capital means downward pressure on executive compensation, and that can't possibly be, can it? Some regulators may be wavering. The $2 billion loss reported by UBS is a timely reminder that there actually is a purpose to increasing capital standards--and in fact it's a good purpose even though it may likely decrease bank executive compensation.
We must not be lulled into thinking that the $2 billion loss by UBS will motivate banks to clean up their risk management messes. Prior scandals didn't, and this one won't. There surely are more rogue traders who haven't been caught yet. When their losses get big enough, they will be. Bank shareholders will pay the price, and taxpayers may have to pony up another bailout. Even though the Volcker rule will, if ever implemented, make it harder for U.S. banks to self-destruct from unauthorized proprietary trading, international interbank linkages will preclude insulation of the U.S. financial system from the failures of foreign banks.
Truth is we'll never get rid of too big to fail. It's a tax on the citizenry that cannot be repealed, Tea Party or no Tea Party. The next best thing would be to proceed with increasing capital standards. Only when banks are forced to pay, at least in part, for the costs they impose on society, will they begin to stop acting like welfare queens.
It's no surprise that both the UBS mess and the preceding scandals involved lightly regulated markets. Bad behavior is always more likely when there are few hall monitors. But the banks themselves have the primary obligation to watch over their people and preserve their assets. They keep failing.
One has to wonder if the inevitability of government support makes it easier for bank executives to short sheet the risk management budget. Top management knows that no matter how massive losses get, the government will not allow a major bank to fail. Experience teaches that top management will generally not suffer much from one of these financial tectonic events. Some embarrassment, yes, and perhaps a modest haircut off one's bonus. But loss of employment and legal sanctions seem to be out of the question. So, why invest large sums in risk management systems when that would only reduce the amount of net income used to determine executive bonuses?
In addition, truly effective risk management would likely mean lower levels of risk taken. That would probably reduce income. It would also reduce losses. But management compensation tends not to be diminished as much by losses as it is leveraged by gains. So top executives are incentivized to take risks, and collecting outsized gains if the risks pay off. And if the risks fry the bank's butt? That would be a shame for shareholders.
Risk management is not just a problem for trading. One sees weak risk management in recent mortgage-related problems. Alleged poor underwriting standards for mortgage-backed securities may cost some big banks tens of billions each. The robo-signing foreclosure scandal will cost yet billions more.
And then there's Europe's sovereign debt crisis. Europe's major banks were the doofusses that financed the profligacy of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, et al. How the . . . heck . . . did they manage to put the world's financial system and economy at the edge of the abyss? Didn't they have controls that suggested diversification--not exactly a novel concept--might be in order?
For the past half-decade or more now, the world's largest banks have repeatedly imperiled prosperity worldwide. At the same time, they are coddled with bailouts, subsidies, and explicit and implicit government guarantees. Yesterday's announcement by Germany and France of support for Greece, and today's announcement by the Fed and other major central banks offering emergency dollar loans to Europe's commercial banks, are just the latest in a long line of handouts. Europe's banks have been facing growing customer runs, and more government munificence was deemed appropriate. Banks are like kids that never lose a soccer game, no matter how far behind they fall. No wonder they don't act maturely.
The regulators' proposal to end this cycle of wealth transfer from taxpayers to bank executives has been to raise capital standards. The so-called Basel III standards, which are in the process of being implemented, may require major banks to more than double the amounts of capital they hold, compared to the ineffectual Basel II standards. Banks are pushing back as vigorously as they can. Increasing capital means downward pressure on executive compensation, and that can't possibly be, can it? Some regulators may be wavering. The $2 billion loss reported by UBS is a timely reminder that there actually is a purpose to increasing capital standards--and in fact it's a good purpose even though it may likely decrease bank executive compensation.
We must not be lulled into thinking that the $2 billion loss by UBS will motivate banks to clean up their risk management messes. Prior scandals didn't, and this one won't. There surely are more rogue traders who haven't been caught yet. When their losses get big enough, they will be. Bank shareholders will pay the price, and taxpayers may have to pony up another bailout. Even though the Volcker rule will, if ever implemented, make it harder for U.S. banks to self-destruct from unauthorized proprietary trading, international interbank linkages will preclude insulation of the U.S. financial system from the failures of foreign banks.
Truth is we'll never get rid of too big to fail. It's a tax on the citizenry that cannot be repealed, Tea Party or no Tea Party. The next best thing would be to proceed with increasing capital standards. Only when banks are forced to pay, at least in part, for the costs they impose on society, will they begin to stop acting like welfare queens.
Wednesday, October 6, 2010
The Monster Within the Foreclosure Crisis
The foreclosure crisis is going from bad to worse. More foreclosures are stopping. Buyers are stepping back from bank owned properties. The U.S. Department of Justice has started looking into the mess.
The crisis is a tabloid's dream: Robo-signers gone wild, lawyers and courts operating foreclosure mills, homeowners booted through fraud, politicians pontificating, and subpoenas flying. But there's a Frankenstein that lurks within this house of horrors: the question of who owns mortgages. This is the worst aspect of the crisis, and if the problem is widespread, it could have extremely damaging consequences.
News coverage has reported that, sometimes, banks attempting to foreclose couldn't prove they owned the mortgage in question (or that they represented the true owner, if the bank was servicing the mortgage). When proof of ownership was lacking, the bank evidently provided courts with documentation that may not entirely be on the up and up. This practice, which could amount to a fraud on the court and be subject to criminal punishment, is now under review as banks, judges, plaintiffs lawyers, prosecutors, and all kinds of other folks try to sort things out.
If the ownership problem is widespread--and it might be, since it seems to have arisen from the hyper-pace of creation and securitization of trillions of dollars of mortgages in past years--the implications could be enormously bad. Banks would have to write off mortgages they can't prove they own, and reverse any past recognition of revenue and earnings from those mortgages. After all, banks can't claim as an asset a mortgage they don't own, nor can they recognize revenue from a non-owned mortgage. The sheer scale of mortgage lending and securitization is such that even if only 1% of mortgages are affected by ownership problems, the amounts involved could reach $100 billion or more of mystery mortgages. (There are about $14 trillion of mortgages outstanding, $7.5 trillion of which are securitized.) The U.S. banking industry would have a tough time swallowing another $100 billion of losses, especially now that banks already need to bulk up their capital to meet heightened capital requirements. Taxpayers, put your hands on your wallets.
Another implication of the mortgage ownership problem is that the downturn in the real estate market could be dragged out for years longer than otherwise. Foreclosures aren't legit unless the true creditor is seeking to collect the loan. It will now take months and even years to plow through legal records to establish true ownership of the many, many thousands of mortgages that might be in question. Buyers will step back from bidding for foreclosed properties. No matter, since some title companies aren't insuring title to such properties, so the banks probably couldn't sell them anyway. The foreclosures now in suspension won't be held off forever. Eventually, some resolution of the current mess will be achieved, those foreclosures will proceed, and the recovered properties resold. So these properties overhang the market, and buyers will be cautious about bidding even for non-foreclosure listings.
Then, there are the foreclosures in states where court approval isn't required. About 23 or so states that require court approvals for foreclosures. The rest allow foreclosures to proceed without court orders. But that doesn't mean that inability to prove ownership of the mortgage is okay in those states. To the contrary, booting a homeowner without being the true creditor on the mortgage probably violates the law in more than one way. Doing so may well be a fraud on the owner. If a sheriff's deputies were used to evict the owner, the lender might be deemed to have lied to sheriff. Lying to a peace officer is never a good idea. A subsequent buyer would not obtain clear title, so the lender might well be deemed to have perpetrated a second fraud. If such clouds over title are widespread, real estate markets in nonjudicial foreclosure states could be crippled for years, as title insurance companies try to sort out their risks and buyers stay away.
Another aspect of the mortgage ownership problem emerges in the securitization market. Large quantities of foreclosure mortgages are or were securitized. The mortgage ownership question implies that investors in the securitizations of those mortgages might or might not have invested in actual mortgages. To the extent, they did not, the banks that underwrote the securitizations can look forward to receiving investors' fraud claims. To make things worse, in the case of past foreclosures, investors who received the proceeds of foreclosures on mortgages they didn't actually have an interest in might be liable to repay the money. Needless to say, they would look to the banks servicing the mortgages for recompense. Given the apparently lousy state of the recordkeeping, the morass on the securitization end of the things could take years to clear up. The revival of the securitization market might be pushed back for a similarly long period. If things turn out to be really bad, securitization as a large-scale method of financing may be gone forever.
The foreclosure mess bears watching. It seems to be about where the financial crisis was in 2007: a year before we see the worst of things. If the foreclosure mess turns out to be a real monster, expect Wall Street and the real estate industry to try to dump it where the financial crisis ended up--in the laps of taxpayers. Whether that will be politically feasible is open to question. We are now witnessing the largest taxpayers' revolt since the Whiskey Rebellion in the 1790s. Maybe this time the banks will have to bear the losses they created.
The crisis is a tabloid's dream: Robo-signers gone wild, lawyers and courts operating foreclosure mills, homeowners booted through fraud, politicians pontificating, and subpoenas flying. But there's a Frankenstein that lurks within this house of horrors: the question of who owns mortgages. This is the worst aspect of the crisis, and if the problem is widespread, it could have extremely damaging consequences.
News coverage has reported that, sometimes, banks attempting to foreclose couldn't prove they owned the mortgage in question (or that they represented the true owner, if the bank was servicing the mortgage). When proof of ownership was lacking, the bank evidently provided courts with documentation that may not entirely be on the up and up. This practice, which could amount to a fraud on the court and be subject to criminal punishment, is now under review as banks, judges, plaintiffs lawyers, prosecutors, and all kinds of other folks try to sort things out.
If the ownership problem is widespread--and it might be, since it seems to have arisen from the hyper-pace of creation and securitization of trillions of dollars of mortgages in past years--the implications could be enormously bad. Banks would have to write off mortgages they can't prove they own, and reverse any past recognition of revenue and earnings from those mortgages. After all, banks can't claim as an asset a mortgage they don't own, nor can they recognize revenue from a non-owned mortgage. The sheer scale of mortgage lending and securitization is such that even if only 1% of mortgages are affected by ownership problems, the amounts involved could reach $100 billion or more of mystery mortgages. (There are about $14 trillion of mortgages outstanding, $7.5 trillion of which are securitized.) The U.S. banking industry would have a tough time swallowing another $100 billion of losses, especially now that banks already need to bulk up their capital to meet heightened capital requirements. Taxpayers, put your hands on your wallets.
Another implication of the mortgage ownership problem is that the downturn in the real estate market could be dragged out for years longer than otherwise. Foreclosures aren't legit unless the true creditor is seeking to collect the loan. It will now take months and even years to plow through legal records to establish true ownership of the many, many thousands of mortgages that might be in question. Buyers will step back from bidding for foreclosed properties. No matter, since some title companies aren't insuring title to such properties, so the banks probably couldn't sell them anyway. The foreclosures now in suspension won't be held off forever. Eventually, some resolution of the current mess will be achieved, those foreclosures will proceed, and the recovered properties resold. So these properties overhang the market, and buyers will be cautious about bidding even for non-foreclosure listings.
Then, there are the foreclosures in states where court approval isn't required. About 23 or so states that require court approvals for foreclosures. The rest allow foreclosures to proceed without court orders. But that doesn't mean that inability to prove ownership of the mortgage is okay in those states. To the contrary, booting a homeowner without being the true creditor on the mortgage probably violates the law in more than one way. Doing so may well be a fraud on the owner. If a sheriff's deputies were used to evict the owner, the lender might be deemed to have lied to sheriff. Lying to a peace officer is never a good idea. A subsequent buyer would not obtain clear title, so the lender might well be deemed to have perpetrated a second fraud. If such clouds over title are widespread, real estate markets in nonjudicial foreclosure states could be crippled for years, as title insurance companies try to sort out their risks and buyers stay away.
Another aspect of the mortgage ownership problem emerges in the securitization market. Large quantities of foreclosure mortgages are or were securitized. The mortgage ownership question implies that investors in the securitizations of those mortgages might or might not have invested in actual mortgages. To the extent, they did not, the banks that underwrote the securitizations can look forward to receiving investors' fraud claims. To make things worse, in the case of past foreclosures, investors who received the proceeds of foreclosures on mortgages they didn't actually have an interest in might be liable to repay the money. Needless to say, they would look to the banks servicing the mortgages for recompense. Given the apparently lousy state of the recordkeeping, the morass on the securitization end of the things could take years to clear up. The revival of the securitization market might be pushed back for a similarly long period. If things turn out to be really bad, securitization as a large-scale method of financing may be gone forever.
The foreclosure mess bears watching. It seems to be about where the financial crisis was in 2007: a year before we see the worst of things. If the foreclosure mess turns out to be a real monster, expect Wall Street and the real estate industry to try to dump it where the financial crisis ended up--in the laps of taxpayers. Whether that will be politically feasible is open to question. We are now witnessing the largest taxpayers' revolt since the Whiskey Rebellion in the 1790s. Maybe this time the banks will have to bear the losses they created.
Thursday, September 30, 2010
Foreclosure Mess: the Mortgage Monster Rears Its Head Again
Like a ghoul in a low budget horror flick, the mortgage morass never dies. Just when you think it's dead, its eyes snap open. Then it smiles a fang-filled grimace and gets up to lurch again in search of victims. The latest resurrection of the beast is the foreclosure mess.
Recent news reports indicate that financial firms servicing mortgages have many times foreclosed on defaulting homeowners without really knowing if they had the legal right to foreclose. Mortgage records in some cases seem to have been evanescent. But, no matter, as key employees whose job it was to review mortgage files and determine that foreclosure was warranted apparently paid scant attention to the contents of the files anyway. One such employee reportedly signed off on thousands of foreclosures a month, perhaps spending only a minute or two per file. Let's guess that his nickname is Robopen.
Other news stories in recent months have reported courts balking at foreclosures when banks couldn't prove they owned the mortgages that were supposedly in default or that they truly had authority to proceed with the foreclosure. There have been allegations of document forgeries and other irregularities. Foreclosures by two major financial institutions--Ally Financial (formerly GMAC) and J.P. Morgan Chase--are grinding to a halt. Today's Washington Post reported that other banks may follow in applying the brakes to their foreclosures. Some state attorneys general are starting to investigate and members of Congress are making noise about compensation for homeowners improperly ejected from their homes.
This is seriously bad shhhhh . . . stuff. The news reports probably reveal only the tip of the iceberg. It's impossible right now to identify all the potential ramifications of this sewage spill. But what we can see already is really stinky.
Systemic risk. With the recently enacted Dodd-Frank legislation, systemic risk is all the rage. So why don't we start with it. There are trillions of dollars of mortgages still held by America's major financial institutions. If the recordkeeping of mortgage servicers is really bad, and numerous mortgages cannot be connected to a legal owner (i.e., a lender or investor who truly has title to the mortgage), a lot of bank writedowns may be necessary. If a bank can't prove it holds the mortgage it thought it held, it will likely have to write off the entire debt. And it will have to stop taking payments from the homeowner, since it can't legally take money it's not entitled to get. We aren't just talking about defaulting and defaulted mortgages. We're talking about all mortgages. A bank that can't document its legal right to a mortgage will have to write it down because you can't count as an asset something you don't own. And the bank can't take payments from a homeowner who doesn't legally owe it any money. The recordkeeping problem here could mean many billions of losses. Federal regulators concerned about bank capital levels just got another massive migraine.
A heroic effort to straighten out the recordkeeping problems might eventually link up a lot of orphaned mortgages with their true owners. But that will probably take months and years. By all indications, each mortgage's file will have to be manually reviewed and straightened out--and not by Robopen or his clones. Such labor intensive work, which likely will require lots of lawyer time, will blow up bank legal budgets nationwide. And, given the inadequacy of the records, lawsuits will sprout like mold in damp drywall. All the while, massive amounts of bank capital will be tied down in mortgages, because the banks won't be able to sell what they can't prove they own. And they may have to reimburse mortgage investors to whom they sold mortgages they didn't own in the first place. Future lending--for new home purchases or to support economic recovery--may recede from today's sputter to a trickle.
Investors, lawyer up and stop buying mortgages. Investors who hold mortgage-backed securities just found themselves living in a world of septic content. They may, or may not, own any mortgage interests. If banks can't be sure who owns which mortgages, they can't be sure what they sold to mortgage investors. The 2007-08 mortgage crisis was bad enough. But today's clouds over title to mortgages means the pricing of numerous mortgage-backed investments may have become hazy indeed.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been backing new mortgages, so investors in newly issued debt may be at less risk. But if the recordkeeping problems include recent mortgages, the U.S taxpayer (that would be you, dear reader) just got screwed. Oh well, chalk it up to life in a world of too-big-to-fail financial institutions.
Homeowners, to the ramparts. If you're struggling to pay the mortgage, and the mortgage servicing bank or firm is getting ugly, fight back. Fight back hard, because you don't want to be shoved out of your home by someone to whom you don't legally owe any money. Demand to see documentation proving their ownership of your mortgage. Hire a lawyer if you don't understand legal documents. If you're getting the runaround, call your Representative and Senators in Congress, and your state's attorney general. If you truly have defaulted, there may well have to be a settling of accounts eventually. But don't get bullied out of your home by someone who has no legal right to foreclose.
Buyers beware. If you're looking to buy a house, don't buy at a foreclosure auction, and don't touch any property that is a bank sale after a foreclosure. Also, if the property is now owned by ordinary individuals, think about avoiding it if it was foreclosed on in the past. There's no way to tell when the recordkeeping mess might have begun; if you want to be truly careful, don't buy anything that has ever been foreclosed on. You can usually tell if there's been a foreclosure by looking at the history of ownership of the home (often available online in county or city records). If a bank, other corporation, or corporate trustee, is listed as an owner, there's a good chance the property was foreclosed on. If you buy a property with a foreclosure in its history, the mortgage mess may mean that the previous owner who was forced out may actually still own the house and might be able to reclaim it from you. You would probably be able to recover money under your title insurance policy (be sure you have one of these, even if your lender also has one). But you'd be out of the house.
There are legal rules that would probably bar prior homeowners from trying to reclaim the house after a number of years, but you'd have to hire a lawyer in the state where the house is situated to find out how many years that would be. This isn't the short time period homeowners have after foreclosure to recover the home, but a longer period that homeowners would have to recover after being forced out due to the foreclosing lender's fraud. The law may not be entirely clear on this issue, which is why you might want to avoid homes that have ever been foreclosed on.
Sellers beware. Sellers may think that with foreclosures grinding to a halt, the flood of bank sales onto the market will abate and prices will rise. They shouldn't smile too quickly. The foreclosure mess will eventually be resolved and the defaulted properties put on the market. That overhang will keep buyers on the cautious side. Mortgage loans may become harder than ever to get, as mortgage investors from Fannie and Freddie to institutional investors everywhere step back from buying more problems until the current problems are fixed. Title insurance premiums could rise sharply. Higher costs mean fewer buyers. Closings could become more difficult, as title insurers verify two or three times over that the correct mortgagor and home equity lender, if there is one, are being paid off. The home(s) down the street whose foreclosures were just suspended may not be well-maintained, as neither a defaulting homeowner nor a bank that may or may not hold the mortgage have much incentive to keep the place up. Your neighborhood could go to weeds if no one is responsible for ownership. A vibrant real estate market can't exist without good recordkeeping.
Taxpayers. Need we say it? After the bailouts of 2008 and 2009, we all know who gets nailed in the end. Senior government officials will solemnly intone well-rehearsed proclamations about protecting the viability of the financial system, etc., etc., so on, and so forth. Then they'll foist the dog doo on you. Bank bonuses might again temporarily fluctuate, but rest assured that the wealthy and powerful won't truly bear the burdens.
Recent news reports indicate that financial firms servicing mortgages have many times foreclosed on defaulting homeowners without really knowing if they had the legal right to foreclose. Mortgage records in some cases seem to have been evanescent. But, no matter, as key employees whose job it was to review mortgage files and determine that foreclosure was warranted apparently paid scant attention to the contents of the files anyway. One such employee reportedly signed off on thousands of foreclosures a month, perhaps spending only a minute or two per file. Let's guess that his nickname is Robopen.
Other news stories in recent months have reported courts balking at foreclosures when banks couldn't prove they owned the mortgages that were supposedly in default or that they truly had authority to proceed with the foreclosure. There have been allegations of document forgeries and other irregularities. Foreclosures by two major financial institutions--Ally Financial (formerly GMAC) and J.P. Morgan Chase--are grinding to a halt. Today's Washington Post reported that other banks may follow in applying the brakes to their foreclosures. Some state attorneys general are starting to investigate and members of Congress are making noise about compensation for homeowners improperly ejected from their homes.
This is seriously bad shhhhh . . . stuff. The news reports probably reveal only the tip of the iceberg. It's impossible right now to identify all the potential ramifications of this sewage spill. But what we can see already is really stinky.
Systemic risk. With the recently enacted Dodd-Frank legislation, systemic risk is all the rage. So why don't we start with it. There are trillions of dollars of mortgages still held by America's major financial institutions. If the recordkeeping of mortgage servicers is really bad, and numerous mortgages cannot be connected to a legal owner (i.e., a lender or investor who truly has title to the mortgage), a lot of bank writedowns may be necessary. If a bank can't prove it holds the mortgage it thought it held, it will likely have to write off the entire debt. And it will have to stop taking payments from the homeowner, since it can't legally take money it's not entitled to get. We aren't just talking about defaulting and defaulted mortgages. We're talking about all mortgages. A bank that can't document its legal right to a mortgage will have to write it down because you can't count as an asset something you don't own. And the bank can't take payments from a homeowner who doesn't legally owe it any money. The recordkeeping problem here could mean many billions of losses. Federal regulators concerned about bank capital levels just got another massive migraine.
A heroic effort to straighten out the recordkeeping problems might eventually link up a lot of orphaned mortgages with their true owners. But that will probably take months and years. By all indications, each mortgage's file will have to be manually reviewed and straightened out--and not by Robopen or his clones. Such labor intensive work, which likely will require lots of lawyer time, will blow up bank legal budgets nationwide. And, given the inadequacy of the records, lawsuits will sprout like mold in damp drywall. All the while, massive amounts of bank capital will be tied down in mortgages, because the banks won't be able to sell what they can't prove they own. And they may have to reimburse mortgage investors to whom they sold mortgages they didn't own in the first place. Future lending--for new home purchases or to support economic recovery--may recede from today's sputter to a trickle.
Investors, lawyer up and stop buying mortgages. Investors who hold mortgage-backed securities just found themselves living in a world of septic content. They may, or may not, own any mortgage interests. If banks can't be sure who owns which mortgages, they can't be sure what they sold to mortgage investors. The 2007-08 mortgage crisis was bad enough. But today's clouds over title to mortgages means the pricing of numerous mortgage-backed investments may have become hazy indeed.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been backing new mortgages, so investors in newly issued debt may be at less risk. But if the recordkeeping problems include recent mortgages, the U.S taxpayer (that would be you, dear reader) just got screwed. Oh well, chalk it up to life in a world of too-big-to-fail financial institutions.
Homeowners, to the ramparts. If you're struggling to pay the mortgage, and the mortgage servicing bank or firm is getting ugly, fight back. Fight back hard, because you don't want to be shoved out of your home by someone to whom you don't legally owe any money. Demand to see documentation proving their ownership of your mortgage. Hire a lawyer if you don't understand legal documents. If you're getting the runaround, call your Representative and Senators in Congress, and your state's attorney general. If you truly have defaulted, there may well have to be a settling of accounts eventually. But don't get bullied out of your home by someone who has no legal right to foreclose.
Buyers beware. If you're looking to buy a house, don't buy at a foreclosure auction, and don't touch any property that is a bank sale after a foreclosure. Also, if the property is now owned by ordinary individuals, think about avoiding it if it was foreclosed on in the past. There's no way to tell when the recordkeeping mess might have begun; if you want to be truly careful, don't buy anything that has ever been foreclosed on. You can usually tell if there's been a foreclosure by looking at the history of ownership of the home (often available online in county or city records). If a bank, other corporation, or corporate trustee, is listed as an owner, there's a good chance the property was foreclosed on. If you buy a property with a foreclosure in its history, the mortgage mess may mean that the previous owner who was forced out may actually still own the house and might be able to reclaim it from you. You would probably be able to recover money under your title insurance policy (be sure you have one of these, even if your lender also has one). But you'd be out of the house.
There are legal rules that would probably bar prior homeowners from trying to reclaim the house after a number of years, but you'd have to hire a lawyer in the state where the house is situated to find out how many years that would be. This isn't the short time period homeowners have after foreclosure to recover the home, but a longer period that homeowners would have to recover after being forced out due to the foreclosing lender's fraud. The law may not be entirely clear on this issue, which is why you might want to avoid homes that have ever been foreclosed on.
Sellers beware. Sellers may think that with foreclosures grinding to a halt, the flood of bank sales onto the market will abate and prices will rise. They shouldn't smile too quickly. The foreclosure mess will eventually be resolved and the defaulted properties put on the market. That overhang will keep buyers on the cautious side. Mortgage loans may become harder than ever to get, as mortgage investors from Fannie and Freddie to institutional investors everywhere step back from buying more problems until the current problems are fixed. Title insurance premiums could rise sharply. Higher costs mean fewer buyers. Closings could become more difficult, as title insurers verify two or three times over that the correct mortgagor and home equity lender, if there is one, are being paid off. The home(s) down the street whose foreclosures were just suspended may not be well-maintained, as neither a defaulting homeowner nor a bank that may or may not hold the mortgage have much incentive to keep the place up. Your neighborhood could go to weeds if no one is responsible for ownership. A vibrant real estate market can't exist without good recordkeeping.
Taxpayers. Need we say it? After the bailouts of 2008 and 2009, we all know who gets nailed in the end. Senior government officials will solemnly intone well-rehearsed proclamations about protecting the viability of the financial system, etc., etc., so on, and so forth. Then they'll foist the dog doo on you. Bank bonuses might again temporarily fluctuate, but rest assured that the wealthy and powerful won't truly bear the burdens.
Sunday, September 12, 2010
Bank Capital Standards: Basel's Leaky Levee
An international gathering of bank regulators in Basel, Switzerland solemnly announced today an increase in bank capital requirements, to which they agreed in order to prevent another worldwide credit crisis like the one in 2008. Minimum capital requirements will triple. The definition of capital will be tightened up, so somewhat elusive assets won't be treated as a safety net. It's even possible that some national regulators may impose countercyclical capital buffer requirements (i.e., rules that would obligate banks to add to their capital in good times as a further buffer against bad times). Regulators worldwide are congratulating themselves on a job well done.
There is, however, a rosy tint to all the hoopla. The new rules, called Basel III, are just a nonbinding agreement among bank supervisors. Nothing is legally binding yet. The mighty dam against financial panic that the Basel Committee announced is not necessarily as sturdy as it might seem.
Implementation Schedule in the Slow Lane. The new rules have to be adopted through whatever regulatory or legislative means would be required in each member nation, and the members have until the beginning of 2013 to begin implementing the new rules. Capital requirements are supposed to double current requirements by the end of 2017, and more than triple by the end of 2019. That's nine years from now. A lot can happen in nine years. Nine years ago, in 2001, the stock market was on an inflation-adjusted basis higher than it is today and unemployment was a lot lower. In the intervening nine years, we would have a housing boom and bust, and a crippling credit crisis. Fortunes would be made in finance, while retirements for the rest of us would be deferred. Americans in 2020 may have a safer, sounder and more stable financial system. But we have to slog through years of same old, same old to get there. In the meantime, with the economy slowing and possibly headed for another recession, we could have yet another banking crisis before we have new bank capital standards in place. (In the past nine years, we've had two recessions, so one more in the next nine years is hardly unimaginable.)
Bank Lobbying and Political Contribution Budgets Boom. Because each member nation has to go through the process of legally adopting the new rules, bank lobbyists and bank-friendly politicians can reasonably anticipate improved cash inflows for the next few years. Banks have it real good at the moment--low capital standards, implicit and explicit government guarantees, gratifyingly generous government subsidies, and only a moderate amount of flak about exceptionally handsome executive compensation. The Basel III rules will lower profits, reduce incentives to use leverage, potentially reduce or eliminate dividends (at least for some years) and, worst of all, dampen banker bonuses. Banks will use all the political influence they have to delay and soften the rules. The preceding Basel II capital requirements, which didn't exactly cover themseves with glory given that the 2007-08 financial crisis happened on their watch and resulted in the largest bank bailouts ever, were announced in 2004, delayed in 2005, and are still in the process of being implemented. Now that the regulators have reached agreement on Basel III, look for the political scrambling to begin in earnest.
Outflanking Basel III. Because of the extraordinary costs of the bank bailouts and the continuing need for federal regulators to subsidize banks, it might not be altogether surprising if the Federal Reserve and other regulators implement Basel III largely as announced. Bankers will look to skin the cat in other ways. Accounting standards can be manipulated. In 2009, bankers called in political chits to get Congress to heap organic material on regulators until they agreed to loosen up accounting rules for mortgage-backed investments (held by banks in enormous amounts). The result was that so called "mark-to-market" accounting was made more of a discretionary judgment than a requirement. What self-interested banker (and is there any other kind?), comparing the losses that would result from marking mortgage-related assets to market, to the earnings that could result from overlooking the cruel dictates of the market, would not conclude that a liberal valuation of his bonus is preferable to a conservative valuation of the bank's assets? Rigorous capital standards don't accomplish much if accounting standards allow hinky assets to be swept under the carpet.
It's possible Basel III will ultimately produce a better financial world. But don't count on it. Keep your debt levels low, your saving rate high and your hand on your wallet.
There is, however, a rosy tint to all the hoopla. The new rules, called Basel III, are just a nonbinding agreement among bank supervisors. Nothing is legally binding yet. The mighty dam against financial panic that the Basel Committee announced is not necessarily as sturdy as it might seem.
Implementation Schedule in the Slow Lane. The new rules have to be adopted through whatever regulatory or legislative means would be required in each member nation, and the members have until the beginning of 2013 to begin implementing the new rules. Capital requirements are supposed to double current requirements by the end of 2017, and more than triple by the end of 2019. That's nine years from now. A lot can happen in nine years. Nine years ago, in 2001, the stock market was on an inflation-adjusted basis higher than it is today and unemployment was a lot lower. In the intervening nine years, we would have a housing boom and bust, and a crippling credit crisis. Fortunes would be made in finance, while retirements for the rest of us would be deferred. Americans in 2020 may have a safer, sounder and more stable financial system. But we have to slog through years of same old, same old to get there. In the meantime, with the economy slowing and possibly headed for another recession, we could have yet another banking crisis before we have new bank capital standards in place. (In the past nine years, we've had two recessions, so one more in the next nine years is hardly unimaginable.)
Bank Lobbying and Political Contribution Budgets Boom. Because each member nation has to go through the process of legally adopting the new rules, bank lobbyists and bank-friendly politicians can reasonably anticipate improved cash inflows for the next few years. Banks have it real good at the moment--low capital standards, implicit and explicit government guarantees, gratifyingly generous government subsidies, and only a moderate amount of flak about exceptionally handsome executive compensation. The Basel III rules will lower profits, reduce incentives to use leverage, potentially reduce or eliminate dividends (at least for some years) and, worst of all, dampen banker bonuses. Banks will use all the political influence they have to delay and soften the rules. The preceding Basel II capital requirements, which didn't exactly cover themseves with glory given that the 2007-08 financial crisis happened on their watch and resulted in the largest bank bailouts ever, were announced in 2004, delayed in 2005, and are still in the process of being implemented. Now that the regulators have reached agreement on Basel III, look for the political scrambling to begin in earnest.
Outflanking Basel III. Because of the extraordinary costs of the bank bailouts and the continuing need for federal regulators to subsidize banks, it might not be altogether surprising if the Federal Reserve and other regulators implement Basel III largely as announced. Bankers will look to skin the cat in other ways. Accounting standards can be manipulated. In 2009, bankers called in political chits to get Congress to heap organic material on regulators until they agreed to loosen up accounting rules for mortgage-backed investments (held by banks in enormous amounts). The result was that so called "mark-to-market" accounting was made more of a discretionary judgment than a requirement. What self-interested banker (and is there any other kind?), comparing the losses that would result from marking mortgage-related assets to market, to the earnings that could result from overlooking the cruel dictates of the market, would not conclude that a liberal valuation of his bonus is preferable to a conservative valuation of the bank's assets? Rigorous capital standards don't accomplish much if accounting standards allow hinky assets to be swept under the carpet.
It's possible Basel III will ultimately produce a better financial world. But don't count on it. Keep your debt levels low, your saving rate high and your hand on your wallet.
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