The Great 2013 Bond Market Chain Saw Massacre has probably caused trillions of dollars of losses. On May 1, 2013, the yield on the U.S. Treasury 10-year note went as low as 1.61%. Since then, it has vaulted as high as 2.72% and most recently closed at 2.63%. Such a jump in yields is, as kindergartners would put it, ginormous.
The inverse math of the bond market would dictate that when yields jump this much this fast, the principal value of bonds will fall painfully and nasty losses will be incurred. While precise numbers aren't readily available, losses in Treasuries may reach a trillion dollars. And when you add in corporates, munis, junk bonds, and mortgage-backed securities, the losses could be multiple trillions.
The game of musical losses is now in progress. Through short positions, derivatives contracts and other hedges, the losses are flowing through to wherever they will end up. The challenge for regulators is to find out, and quickly, where that end will be. What must be ascertained is whether the losses are spread out and landing in places where they can be absorbed without too much fuss. Or whether the losses are concentrated somewhere and could have secondary and tertiary rippling effects (i.e., cause a run on one or a few major financial institution(s)). Well within living memory (2008, to be exact), sharp losses in the mortgage markets triggered tsunamis in the financial markets that washed over Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, and threatened to wipe out AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Merrill Lynch. Bailouts and regulator-encouraged acquisitions barely prevented an abrupt, loud, low-flow flush of the entire financial system.
Regulators should be proactively trying to pin down where the bond market losses will fall. Complicating their task is the likelihood of speculators who used leverage to make derivatives bets on a fall in interest rates. Since there is no prohibition on speculating with derivatives, as opposed to hedging, it is possible (and probable) that some players in the financial markets made such a bet. That wouldn't be intrinsically different from the bet that John Paulson made in mortgages shortly before the mortgage crisis that sweetened his net worth by billions. It's also not intrinsically different from the gold bets that John Paulson's gold fund has likely made, which reportedly has sustained losses in excess of 60% (ouch). Any such speculative bets in the bond markets could exacerbate the game of musical losses, and make the regulators' tasks all the more difficult, since many of the speculators might be trading through entities chartered in off-shore locations that might frustrate U.S. government oversight. But the Feds will have to do their best, because the alternative would be what happened in 2008, when they waited until things blew up and bailouts were just about the only option.
There's more. The yield curve has been steepening during the last two months. The short end remains squashed by the Fed's scorched earth policy on short term interest rates. But the long end, as we noted above, has been rising meteorically. This steepening makes attractive a type of carry trade. It's possible to make a lot of money by borrowing short term and investing long term.
Fed policy makes this carry trade all the more enticing. The Fed's intent, as far as it can be discerned from the entrails currently visible, is to begin cutting down on bond purchases (i.e., QE) within months, but to keep short term rates at zero until unemployment reaches 6.5%. Although employment has been rising, the unemployment rate has been static for several months. While no one really knows when unemployment will reach 6.5%, it's not uncommon to read predictions of mid-2014 or so for that level to be acheived. If so, the carry trade could be profitable for a while, especially if the Fed's reduction of bond purchases push long term yields even higher.
To paraphrase P.T. Barnum, or Mark Twain, or somebody, there's a smarty pants who shows up in the financial markets every minute. Some--and perhaps many-- will surely indulge in this carry trade, most likely on a leveraged basis (because leverage boosts profits, assuming the trade works in your favor). But if the unemployment rate unexpectedly drops quickly to 6.5%, the partakers of this carry trade might wonder if they aren't living in a septic tank.
Either way, the regulators have to keep an eye out for the possibility of mounting risks from this sort of carry trade. It could look like easy money to banks, hedge funds, insurance companies and other important players in the financial markets--after all, with the Federal Reserve at least momentarily anchoring their borrowing costs while pushing up their profits, the government is on their side. But borrowing short to invest long is the E. coli that has poisoned many a would-be financial marvel. Regulators need to be watchful not only for bond market losses from risks that have already materialized, but also for the growth of more risk from the changing landscape of the market.
Showing posts with label carry trade. Show all posts
Showing posts with label carry trade. Show all posts
Wednesday, July 10, 2013
Monday, August 13, 2012
How the Federal Reserve Discourages Consumer Demand
The Fed has, for the past four years, waged a relentless war on interest rates, suppressing them to zero at the short end of the yield curve and to record lows at the long end. This was all done in the hope of encouraging lending and fostering consumer demand. With about 70% of the U.S. economy coming from consumption, there is good reason to try to encourage consumers. But the Fed's basic approach has been to tilt the playing field sharply toward borrowers and punish savers for having the temerity to be frugal, all with questionable impact on consumer demand.
The boost given to borrowers appears to be limited. Interest rates on credit cards have, if anything, been rising. This is in part due to changes in the law that have limited some of the fees with which banks previously whacked their customers. But the sharp drop in short term rates since 2008 has not been mirrored in the credit card market. With recent credit card rate increases, borrowers have the incentive to reduce balances, not boost spending.
In the mortgage markets, rates are reaching all time lows. But only a limited segment of mortgage borrowers are able to qualify for refinancing (and a lot that can refi have already done so). The people who need help the most (i.e., those underwater on their mortgages) find refinancing a tough slog, if possible at all.
In the business world, rates may or may not be dropping, depending on the creditworthiness of the borrower. Business people tend to be cautious right now, with all the headwinds from slowing economies in America and Asia, recession in Europe, the unsolvable Euro crisis, and near complete political dysfunction in Washington. Drops in interest rates aren't likely to greatly affect their view toward business borrowing, investment or hiring. That's evident from the fact that businesses are choosing to hold billions of dollars in cash for essentially no return rather than invest or hire. If you're not deploying your own cash to invest or hire, why would you borrow even at a low interest rate to invest or hire?
But the impact of low interest rates on savers is significant. Let's hypothetically take a relatively frugal American who is approaching or in retirement, and in 2006 had $750,000 in a diversified portfolio. During the financial crisis of 2007-08, this portfolio, we'll assume, was pummeled down to $500,000. Many investors victimized in this fashion have fled equities and put their reduced savings into fixed income investments. For the sake of simplicity, let's assume the Fed's war on interest rates kept the yield curve 1% below where it might have been with a somewhat more balanced approach by the Fed. (Thus, at the low end, the Fed would today be targeting a fed funds rate of 1 to 1.25% instead of today's 0 to 0.25%.) The interest lost by our hypothetical saver would be $5,000 a year. Compounded over 4 years, the saver would have lost about $20,302 before taxes. While this amount after taxes wouldn't buy a yacht, and only a modest car, consumption would probably be noticeably boosted if millions of Americans had enough additional money to buy a modest car.
Given that the Fed has promised to keep interest rates ultra low until late 2014, the lost income will reach approximately $30,760 per hypothetical saver in a couple of years. And this amount could increase if the Fed extends that promise into 2015 (a serious possibility).
It's important to keep in mind that these income losses are permanent. There is no way savers can recoup these losses. The Fed won't boost interest rates extra high later on in order to bail out the frugal. So savers' consumption will be permanently reduced.
The Fed claims to be greatly concerned with consumer expectations and their general state of mind, believing that public confidence is crucial to restoring demand and prosperity. The message sent by the Fed's long and continuing war on interest rates is that things are bad and will be bad for a long time. Any rational consumer, particularly those that are frugal to begin with, will hunker down, dig the fox hole even deeper, cover it with a sturdy layer of thick logs, camouflage it with an abundance of branches and brush, and never even dare to peek out.
The situation in Japan is illuminating. The Japanese central bank has, since its own financial crisis in 1989-90, banished positive interest rates from the land (encouraging the so-called carry trade, where Japanese citizens deploy their savings or borrowed yen into investments in foreign currencies that offer positive returns; thus Japan's capital is productively used in other nations). Japanese consumers have gone from being luxury hounds to penny pinchers and bargain hunters. Japan has been stagnant for more than two decades, and its most recent economic statistics show that the stagnation has become a seemingly permanent and undesired house guest. America appears to be headed down the same path. Although the headlines generated by politicians and candidates for political office promise solutions, hard evidence to be optimistic remains scarce. Even the tech sector, America's economic sweetheart, has offered a lot of disappointment lately, with Facebook's stock losing almost half its IPO valuation and other familiar tech companies serving up results akin to the financial equivalent of Spam quiche. Will America become Japan? This is no longer the question. The question now is how will America stop being like Japan.
The boost given to borrowers appears to be limited. Interest rates on credit cards have, if anything, been rising. This is in part due to changes in the law that have limited some of the fees with which banks previously whacked their customers. But the sharp drop in short term rates since 2008 has not been mirrored in the credit card market. With recent credit card rate increases, borrowers have the incentive to reduce balances, not boost spending.
In the mortgage markets, rates are reaching all time lows. But only a limited segment of mortgage borrowers are able to qualify for refinancing (and a lot that can refi have already done so). The people who need help the most (i.e., those underwater on their mortgages) find refinancing a tough slog, if possible at all.
In the business world, rates may or may not be dropping, depending on the creditworthiness of the borrower. Business people tend to be cautious right now, with all the headwinds from slowing economies in America and Asia, recession in Europe, the unsolvable Euro crisis, and near complete political dysfunction in Washington. Drops in interest rates aren't likely to greatly affect their view toward business borrowing, investment or hiring. That's evident from the fact that businesses are choosing to hold billions of dollars in cash for essentially no return rather than invest or hire. If you're not deploying your own cash to invest or hire, why would you borrow even at a low interest rate to invest or hire?
But the impact of low interest rates on savers is significant. Let's hypothetically take a relatively frugal American who is approaching or in retirement, and in 2006 had $750,000 in a diversified portfolio. During the financial crisis of 2007-08, this portfolio, we'll assume, was pummeled down to $500,000. Many investors victimized in this fashion have fled equities and put their reduced savings into fixed income investments. For the sake of simplicity, let's assume the Fed's war on interest rates kept the yield curve 1% below where it might have been with a somewhat more balanced approach by the Fed. (Thus, at the low end, the Fed would today be targeting a fed funds rate of 1 to 1.25% instead of today's 0 to 0.25%.) The interest lost by our hypothetical saver would be $5,000 a year. Compounded over 4 years, the saver would have lost about $20,302 before taxes. While this amount after taxes wouldn't buy a yacht, and only a modest car, consumption would probably be noticeably boosted if millions of Americans had enough additional money to buy a modest car.
Given that the Fed has promised to keep interest rates ultra low until late 2014, the lost income will reach approximately $30,760 per hypothetical saver in a couple of years. And this amount could increase if the Fed extends that promise into 2015 (a serious possibility).
It's important to keep in mind that these income losses are permanent. There is no way savers can recoup these losses. The Fed won't boost interest rates extra high later on in order to bail out the frugal. So savers' consumption will be permanently reduced.
The Fed claims to be greatly concerned with consumer expectations and their general state of mind, believing that public confidence is crucial to restoring demand and prosperity. The message sent by the Fed's long and continuing war on interest rates is that things are bad and will be bad for a long time. Any rational consumer, particularly those that are frugal to begin with, will hunker down, dig the fox hole even deeper, cover it with a sturdy layer of thick logs, camouflage it with an abundance of branches and brush, and never even dare to peek out.
The situation in Japan is illuminating. The Japanese central bank has, since its own financial crisis in 1989-90, banished positive interest rates from the land (encouraging the so-called carry trade, where Japanese citizens deploy their savings or borrowed yen into investments in foreign currencies that offer positive returns; thus Japan's capital is productively used in other nations). Japanese consumers have gone from being luxury hounds to penny pinchers and bargain hunters. Japan has been stagnant for more than two decades, and its most recent economic statistics show that the stagnation has become a seemingly permanent and undesired house guest. America appears to be headed down the same path. Although the headlines generated by politicians and candidates for political office promise solutions, hard evidence to be optimistic remains scarce. Even the tech sector, America's economic sweetheart, has offered a lot of disappointment lately, with Facebook's stock losing almost half its IPO valuation and other familiar tech companies serving up results akin to the financial equivalent of Spam quiche. Will America become Japan? This is no longer the question. The question now is how will America stop being like Japan.
Wednesday, January 12, 2011
Unintended Consequences of Monetary Policy
Today's news reported that China's foreign exchange reserves have risen to $2.85 trillion (yes, trillion, not billion), an increase of 20% over the past year. This is almost triple the next highest amount of foreign reserves held by a central bank (Japan, at $1.04 trillion). At the same time, China's trade balance narrowed over the past year. In other words, China's increased holdings of foreign reserves don't come from a net increase in exports.
Many commentators blame China's low exchange rate for the yuan, which it depresses in order to protect its exporters. But if net exports aren't increasing, something else is going on. A prime suspect is the carry trade, in which speculators borrow dollars made cheap by the Fed's easy money policies and convert them into yuan in order to profit from China's rising interest rates. The dichotomy in interest rates between China (high) and America (low) gives capital the incentive to flee the U.S. for higher returns in China. The fact that China has recently loosened trading restrictions in the yuan, allowing it to be traded in Hong Kong and now the U.S., only makes such capital flight easier. The Chinese central bank will levitate rates further in order to combat accelerating inflation in China, so the disparity with America will only increase.
China's high interest rate/low yuan exchange rate strategy exacerbates economic imbalance. The high rates will predictably draw in foreign capital, and the low exchange rate for the yuan will only aggravate the phenomenon by making it cheap in forex terms to buy high interest rate yuan obligations. But the Federal Reserve's easy money policy heightens incentives for speculators to invest the dollars it's printing in China rather than America. Such a capital outflow would help explain why inflation has been so low in the U.S., notwithstanding the Fed's 'round the clock money printing operation. Capital outflow detracts from whatever stimulus effect the Fed's quantitative easing program might have. Although unintended, QE is boosting China's forex reserves. The Chinese want to eat their cake and have it, too. So does the Fed, hoping that printing money will spur growth without inflation. But it isn't spurring much growth, and is producing inflation in China. That does nobody much good.
Monetary policy is heightening the imbalance between China and America. The Fed doesn't intend this, and the Chinese surely recognize the dangers as well. But China can't turn on a dime away from an export driven economy, and the Fed clearly will persist in QE come hell or high water. So we shouldn't expect things to change much in the foreseeable future.
Many commentators blame China's low exchange rate for the yuan, which it depresses in order to protect its exporters. But if net exports aren't increasing, something else is going on. A prime suspect is the carry trade, in which speculators borrow dollars made cheap by the Fed's easy money policies and convert them into yuan in order to profit from China's rising interest rates. The dichotomy in interest rates between China (high) and America (low) gives capital the incentive to flee the U.S. for higher returns in China. The fact that China has recently loosened trading restrictions in the yuan, allowing it to be traded in Hong Kong and now the U.S., only makes such capital flight easier. The Chinese central bank will levitate rates further in order to combat accelerating inflation in China, so the disparity with America will only increase.
China's high interest rate/low yuan exchange rate strategy exacerbates economic imbalance. The high rates will predictably draw in foreign capital, and the low exchange rate for the yuan will only aggravate the phenomenon by making it cheap in forex terms to buy high interest rate yuan obligations. But the Federal Reserve's easy money policy heightens incentives for speculators to invest the dollars it's printing in China rather than America. Such a capital outflow would help explain why inflation has been so low in the U.S., notwithstanding the Fed's 'round the clock money printing operation. Capital outflow detracts from whatever stimulus effect the Fed's quantitative easing program might have. Although unintended, QE is boosting China's forex reserves. The Chinese want to eat their cake and have it, too. So does the Fed, hoping that printing money will spur growth without inflation. But it isn't spurring much growth, and is producing inflation in China. That does nobody much good.
Monetary policy is heightening the imbalance between China and America. The Fed doesn't intend this, and the Chinese surely recognize the dangers as well. But China can't turn on a dime away from an export driven economy, and the Fed clearly will persist in QE come hell or high water. So we shouldn't expect things to change much in the foreseeable future.
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