The federal government proposes to use inflation to smack the middle class. The Federal Reserve has an inflation target of 2%, and some Fed officials, fearing that deflation is around the corner--have recently been openly grousing about how inflation--running just above 1%--is too low. They want to take away your spending power faster. One of their primary tools for fueling inflation is to obliterate positive interest rates--or, stated otherwise, to deprive you of interest income. Your faint memories of the distant past, when interest income actually required you to fill out Schedule B for your tax return, will become entirely ethereal.
Meanwhile, the Obama administration has proposed to use a less generous inflation adjustment (the Chained CPI) for Social Security recipients and federal and military retirees. The Chained CPI would also be used to adjust tax brackets, with the effect that taxes would be higher than under the currently used CPI. In other words, the Fed wants to increase inflation, while the President wants less protection for retirees and taxpayers from the ravages of inflation.
Those whose incomes are middle class or lower (i.e., $100,000 a year or less) tend to be vulnerable to inflation. They have little discretionary income left after necessary monthly expenses, and consequently, not much of a buffer against increases in inflation. Retirees are especially defenseless. Add the heavier taxes resulting from the Chained CPI, and the federal government's inflation policies could effectively reduce middle class and retiree incomes in real terms.
With the sluggish U.S. economy 70% dependent on consumption, it makes no sense for the federal government to deploy inflation as a weapon against those with middle class or lower incomes. Reduce incomes and people will consume less. If these federal policies somehow stimulate greater economic growth, it isn't hard to figure who will benefit the most from that greater growth, and it ain't gonna be the lowest 80%.
The Chained CPI hasn't become law yet, and not all Fed officials want to ignite inflation. So the worst may not come to pass. But the lowest 80%, already facing uncertain employment prospects and stagnant wages, really don't need to be squeezed by inflation policies that make sense only to those well-to-do people who are insulated from their impacts.
Sunday, May 26, 2013
Saturday, May 18, 2013
News Flash: Republicans Don't Like Profiling
Well, it appears that Republicans don't like profiling after all. At least, not when Tea Partiers are profiled by the IRS. When the targets of profiling are black or Muslim, well . . . .
Of course, the IRS should not have profiled Tea Partiers. As liberals have been saying for decades, profiling is unfair and illegal. But the level of outrage emanating from the right is pathetic, at best. Profiling is all too common, and we shouldn't get any more outraged over the IRS's profiling of Tea Partiers than we do over the profiling of blacks, Muslims and other people. Finding a conservative commentator who'd agree with this point would take longer than the IRS took to process Tea Party nonprofit applications. And that's the problem with political discourse these days. The point of view too often taken is "If it hurts me, it's bad. If it hurts people I don't like or don't care about, it's okay." Profiling is unprincipled. But so are way too many participants in today's political mosh pit.
Of course, the IRS should not have profiled Tea Partiers. As liberals have been saying for decades, profiling is unfair and illegal. But the level of outrage emanating from the right is pathetic, at best. Profiling is all too common, and we shouldn't get any more outraged over the IRS's profiling of Tea Partiers than we do over the profiling of blacks, Muslims and other people. Finding a conservative commentator who'd agree with this point would take longer than the IRS took to process Tea Party nonprofit applications. And that's the problem with political discourse these days. The point of view too often taken is "If it hurts me, it's bad. If it hurts people I don't like or don't care about, it's okay." Profiling is unprincipled. But so are way too many participants in today's political mosh pit.
Wednesday, May 15, 2013
Beware of Overpriced Assets
The delirious exuberance of stocks today is reminiscent of the stock market just before its earlier peaks in March and April 2000, and in the fall of 2007. Prices move up in defiance of risks and uncertainties. Stock indices set records every week. Bulls overrun the markets. Bears have become a seriously endangered species.
Even as financial messiahs proclaim a brave new market in spite of the stumbling economic recovery in America and recession in the rest of the industrialized world, let us recall the sources of the last two market busts: highly overpriced assets. In the late 1990s, the bubble was in tech stocks. In 2007-08, housing and real estate mortgages were grossly overpriced. In both instances, the sheer quantity of inflated assets ensured that when the markets turned, losses would be enormous. Given the dazzling rise of stocks over the past few years, it behooves us to ask if there is a comparable risk today?
The answer would appear to be yes. Investors have poured vast amounts of money into bonds of every stripe and variety. Bond valuations, even of junk bonds, have reached highly optimistic levels. Bonds are priced for perfection. If any imperfection appears, losses--and a lot of them--will follow.
The most obvious risk to bondholders is that the Federal Reserve and other central banks will step back from the extremely accommodative policies they have instituted. This will happen sooner or later, probably sooner in America and later in Europe and Japan. When it does, bondholders will incur losses, and those losses will be big simply because of the huge amounts of money that have flowed into bonds.
The Fed seems to think it can manage the process of shifting from quantitative easing to unwinding its $3 trillion plus balance sheet (i.e., quantitative tightening). Perhaps it can do so without causing severe short-term turmoil in the markets. But it can't circumvent a basic problem: when interest rates rise and bond prices fall, a lot of losses will be incurred. These losses must land somewhere. They might be shifted from one investor to another by means of derivatives and other hedges. But someone, ultimately, has to take the loss.
The fact that losses in the financial markets have to land on someone somewhere wreaked havoc on the world's major economies following the real estate crash of 2007-08. Investors around the globe who bought mortgage-backed securities, CDOs, CDOs squared, and other such financial alchemy paid the price for drinking too much of the Kool-Aid du jour. We live with the resulting economic pain even to this day.
The bond markets are like a coiled spring that presents a similar problem. Extremely high prices have been paid for bonds, and bondholders face serious risk of losses when rates rise. The sheer quantity of potential losses is the scary thing. Those losses will have to land on someone, somewhere, and that will be painful. The Fed's quantitative easing program has only exacerbated the risks, and the Fed's near term success in preventing depression has burnished its image of competence, which may have blinded bond investors to the dangers of the market downturn that must take place eventually. As history repeatedly has demonstrated, the Fed is fallible and its fallibility is accompanied by serious consequences for the financial markets and the economy.
By promoting ultra low interest rates for five years, the Fed has allowed a massive build-up of investment in overpriced bonds. While central bank intervention in a crisis is to be applauded, a years-long distortion of market forces will surely do bad things, and bad things have been done. The only question now is when and how we will suffer the consequences.
Even as financial messiahs proclaim a brave new market in spite of the stumbling economic recovery in America and recession in the rest of the industrialized world, let us recall the sources of the last two market busts: highly overpriced assets. In the late 1990s, the bubble was in tech stocks. In 2007-08, housing and real estate mortgages were grossly overpriced. In both instances, the sheer quantity of inflated assets ensured that when the markets turned, losses would be enormous. Given the dazzling rise of stocks over the past few years, it behooves us to ask if there is a comparable risk today?
The answer would appear to be yes. Investors have poured vast amounts of money into bonds of every stripe and variety. Bond valuations, even of junk bonds, have reached highly optimistic levels. Bonds are priced for perfection. If any imperfection appears, losses--and a lot of them--will follow.
The most obvious risk to bondholders is that the Federal Reserve and other central banks will step back from the extremely accommodative policies they have instituted. This will happen sooner or later, probably sooner in America and later in Europe and Japan. When it does, bondholders will incur losses, and those losses will be big simply because of the huge amounts of money that have flowed into bonds.
The Fed seems to think it can manage the process of shifting from quantitative easing to unwinding its $3 trillion plus balance sheet (i.e., quantitative tightening). Perhaps it can do so without causing severe short-term turmoil in the markets. But it can't circumvent a basic problem: when interest rates rise and bond prices fall, a lot of losses will be incurred. These losses must land somewhere. They might be shifted from one investor to another by means of derivatives and other hedges. But someone, ultimately, has to take the loss.
The fact that losses in the financial markets have to land on someone somewhere wreaked havoc on the world's major economies following the real estate crash of 2007-08. Investors around the globe who bought mortgage-backed securities, CDOs, CDOs squared, and other such financial alchemy paid the price for drinking too much of the Kool-Aid du jour. We live with the resulting economic pain even to this day.
The bond markets are like a coiled spring that presents a similar problem. Extremely high prices have been paid for bonds, and bondholders face serious risk of losses when rates rise. The sheer quantity of potential losses is the scary thing. Those losses will have to land on someone, somewhere, and that will be painful. The Fed's quantitative easing program has only exacerbated the risks, and the Fed's near term success in preventing depression has burnished its image of competence, which may have blinded bond investors to the dangers of the market downturn that must take place eventually. As history repeatedly has demonstrated, the Fed is fallible and its fallibility is accompanied by serious consequences for the financial markets and the economy.
By promoting ultra low interest rates for five years, the Fed has allowed a massive build-up of investment in overpriced bonds. While central bank intervention in a crisis is to be applauded, a years-long distortion of market forces will surely do bad things, and bad things have been done. The only question now is when and how we will suffer the consequences.
Tuesday, April 30, 2013
How Is GDP Financed?
It may seem strange to ask how GDP is financed. GDP simply measures the total market value of final goods and services that an economy produces. It is a way to measure national income, not a measure of assets on a national balance sheet.
But the way GDP is paid for does matter. If large quantities of borrowed money finance GDP, then GDP in future years may be less sustainable than GDP produced by organic growth (i.e., GDP derived from people and companies spending their earnings, rather than borrowings). The pauper nations of the EU, mostly located on the southern rim, are good examples. They borrowed heavily (or their banks borrowed heavily) to finance consumption. For a while, their GDPs grew. But debt, unfortunately, has to be repaid. A nation's whose GDP is heavily dependent on borrowed money will eventually have to pay the piper. If those payments are burdensome enough, the nation's GDP bubble will burst, and recession will follow. That isn't hypothetical; look at Greece, Ireland, Cyprus and Spain. Indeed, look at the EU as a whole, which is sinking into recession even as we blog.
In America, the picture ain't pretty. Even though GDP is nominally growing, in the first quarter of this year at an annual rate of 2.5%, the question of sustainability looms. The federal government is constraining its borrowing (partly because of sequestration and partly because of Social Security and income tax increases). Thus, the federal budget wouldn't be a source of GDP growth.
But the Federal Reserve's quantitative easing program is. The Fed is pumping $85 billion a month into the economy through purchases of financial assets. Over a full year, the QE program would pump $1 trillion into the economy. That's equivalent to about 6% of America's $16 trillion GDP. It wouldn't be accurate to say that $1 trillion spent on QE results in $1 trillion of GDP. Much of the money printed by the Fed for QE is recycled back to the Federal Reserve System in the form of member bank deposits at Federal Reserve banks. This process is a near wash (except that it gives the depositor-banks riskless profits). But QE is boosting the economy. Our stock market--bizarrely exuberant in the face of a tepid economy--needs its regular fix of QE to maintain and increase its high. The real estate markets seem to be getting a boost from the Fed's purchases of mortgage-backed securities. Increases in asset values such as these appear to be creating a wealth effect that boosts spending (mostly by the top 10%). That is probably a primary source of GDP growth today.
But QE is similar to borrowed money. At some point, the Fed will start selling down its more than $3 trillion balance sheet. This akin to debt repayment. It will remove money from the economy. When there is less money to spend, there may well be less economic growth. The Fed is hoping that the economy will be organically growing briskly by the time it goes into QT (i.e., quantitative tightening). But there's no way to know for sure that will be the case. The Fed may have to shift to QT because of a rise in inflation, whether or not growth has revived. Whatever the reason for QT, it will constrain growth. In some circumstances, it could produce a recession.
Like toothpaste and genies, QE on the loose isn't easily put back into the place where it came from. There's no riskless way to execute QT. It's possible that continuation of the Fed's QE program could stimulate the economy to resume vigorous growth. But that's far from certain. And every additional month of QE heightens the risks that our economy is becoming overleveraged.
But the way GDP is paid for does matter. If large quantities of borrowed money finance GDP, then GDP in future years may be less sustainable than GDP produced by organic growth (i.e., GDP derived from people and companies spending their earnings, rather than borrowings). The pauper nations of the EU, mostly located on the southern rim, are good examples. They borrowed heavily (or their banks borrowed heavily) to finance consumption. For a while, their GDPs grew. But debt, unfortunately, has to be repaid. A nation's whose GDP is heavily dependent on borrowed money will eventually have to pay the piper. If those payments are burdensome enough, the nation's GDP bubble will burst, and recession will follow. That isn't hypothetical; look at Greece, Ireland, Cyprus and Spain. Indeed, look at the EU as a whole, which is sinking into recession even as we blog.
In America, the picture ain't pretty. Even though GDP is nominally growing, in the first quarter of this year at an annual rate of 2.5%, the question of sustainability looms. The federal government is constraining its borrowing (partly because of sequestration and partly because of Social Security and income tax increases). Thus, the federal budget wouldn't be a source of GDP growth.
But the Federal Reserve's quantitative easing program is. The Fed is pumping $85 billion a month into the economy through purchases of financial assets. Over a full year, the QE program would pump $1 trillion into the economy. That's equivalent to about 6% of America's $16 trillion GDP. It wouldn't be accurate to say that $1 trillion spent on QE results in $1 trillion of GDP. Much of the money printed by the Fed for QE is recycled back to the Federal Reserve System in the form of member bank deposits at Federal Reserve banks. This process is a near wash (except that it gives the depositor-banks riskless profits). But QE is boosting the economy. Our stock market--bizarrely exuberant in the face of a tepid economy--needs its regular fix of QE to maintain and increase its high. The real estate markets seem to be getting a boost from the Fed's purchases of mortgage-backed securities. Increases in asset values such as these appear to be creating a wealth effect that boosts spending (mostly by the top 10%). That is probably a primary source of GDP growth today.
But QE is similar to borrowed money. At some point, the Fed will start selling down its more than $3 trillion balance sheet. This akin to debt repayment. It will remove money from the economy. When there is less money to spend, there may well be less economic growth. The Fed is hoping that the economy will be organically growing briskly by the time it goes into QT (i.e., quantitative tightening). But there's no way to know for sure that will be the case. The Fed may have to shift to QT because of a rise in inflation, whether or not growth has revived. Whatever the reason for QT, it will constrain growth. In some circumstances, it could produce a recession.
Like toothpaste and genies, QE on the loose isn't easily put back into the place where it came from. There's no riskless way to execute QT. It's possible that continuation of the Fed's QE program could stimulate the economy to resume vigorous growth. But that's far from certain. And every additional month of QE heightens the risks that our economy is becoming overleveraged.
Friday, April 26, 2013
Will the Affordable Care Act Lower Health Insurance Costs?
In 2014, two of the most important provisions of the Affordable Care Act take effect. These require health insurers to accept all applicants without regard to prior medical conditions, and to provide unlimited coverage. Although some recent news stories indicate that health insurers are raising premiums in 2014 to compensate for these provisions, it's possible to foresee a time when these same provisions will constrain the growth of health insurance costs.
These requirements--no exclusion for prior medical conditions and unlimited coverage--provide powerful incentives for insurers to manage health care rationally. Currently, many health insurers endeavor to limit their exposure to the costliest patients (i.e., those with existing medical conditions and those needing very expensive care). In other words, insurers attempt to avoid covering those most in need of coverage. It's no surprise that the most common reason for individuals to file bankruptcy is unmanageable medical bills. It is perhaps surprising that most of these individuals have some health insurance coverage--but not enough.
By forbidding insurers to squeeze out those in the greatest need of coverage, the Affordable Care Act now steers insurers' attention toward managing care rationally and providing the best quality, most effective care. Preventive care, such as regular physicals, screenings, immunizations, wellness programs, and so on will take priority. People will hopefully fall ill and injure themselves less often and perhaps less severely. In the long run, this fundamental change in approach may lower the growth of premiums, as improvements in health from better preventive care hopefully reduce the need for medical treatment. Premiums will rise next year for many--but only because they're getting better coverage. And that improved coverage may pay off in the long run.
These requirements--no exclusion for prior medical conditions and unlimited coverage--provide powerful incentives for insurers to manage health care rationally. Currently, many health insurers endeavor to limit their exposure to the costliest patients (i.e., those with existing medical conditions and those needing very expensive care). In other words, insurers attempt to avoid covering those most in need of coverage. It's no surprise that the most common reason for individuals to file bankruptcy is unmanageable medical bills. It is perhaps surprising that most of these individuals have some health insurance coverage--but not enough.
By forbidding insurers to squeeze out those in the greatest need of coverage, the Affordable Care Act now steers insurers' attention toward managing care rationally and providing the best quality, most effective care. Preventive care, such as regular physicals, screenings, immunizations, wellness programs, and so on will take priority. People will hopefully fall ill and injure themselves less often and perhaps less severely. In the long run, this fundamental change in approach may lower the growth of premiums, as improvements in health from better preventive care hopefully reduce the need for medical treatment. Premiums will rise next year for many--but only because they're getting better coverage. And that improved coverage may pay off in the long run.
Tuesday, April 16, 2013
Your Social Security Benefits: Countering the Chained CPI
The President has proposed using the Chained CPI as the measure for cost-of-living increases in Social Security benefits, and other federal and military retirement benefits. The impact on benefits would be to reduce the annual increase by about 0.3%. While this amount seems small, it accumulates over time. After ten years, your benefits would be reduced by 3-4% per year. After twenty years, the reduction would be around 6-7% per year. If you receive Social Security for thirty years, the reduction would be around 9% or more per year. For those relying heavily on Social Security, which could be up to half of all recipients, that can hurt, especially considering the unstoppable, uber-inflationary costs of medical care for the elderly. The Chained CPI proposal is criticized for hitting the most elderly and vulnerable the hardest. Women take a bigger hit than men because they live longer and depend more heavily on Social Security.
The Chained CPI would also increase taxes. Tax brackets and certain other features of the tax system are adjusted for inflation. If the adjustment is smaller, as it would be with the Chained CPI, the effect would be to raise taxes. As with Social Security benefits, the tax increases would fall most heavily on those at the lowest income levels (who otherwise are taxed lightly).
If you're wondering if implementation of the Chained CPI would affect you, the answer is yes. It affects everyone, although the well-off would suffer the least in relative terms. The likelihood of the adoption of the Chained CPI is difficult to predict. Conservatives and many moderates generally like the idea, although the white Boomers at the heart of the Republican Party will sooner or later figure out that they would take a bullet for their party's ideology from the Chained CPI. When they do, we'll find out if there's a cure for stupid.
Anyway, how could you counter the impact of the Chained CPI, if it's adopted? Save more. Start saving more now, and save more every month. It's hard to estimate how much more, because the answer would depend heavily on the specifics of your financial situation. But a rough guesstimate might be 1% of your income or a bit more if you're in your 20s or 30s, 2% for those in their 40s, and 3-4% if you've reached the Big 5-0. This may not sound like much, but try doing it (remember, this amount would be in addition to other saving you should be doing for retirement). A lot of Americans can't. Those who fail should acquire a taste for dog food, because it looms in their futures.
President Obama may think that proposing the Chained CPI keeps federal spending at a relatively stimulative level in the near term future, to help pull the economy out of the Great Recession, while reducing long term spending to help control the deficit. But if rational Americans begin saving more to compensate for the lower benefits and higher taxes promised for their retirements, the near term impact of the Chained CPI would be to reduce consumption and retard recovery. And continuation of the Great Recession would prolong the large deficits we now have.
The President seems obsessed with attaining a Grand Compromise. He seems to think doing so will burnish his legacy. That's weird. Consider the Presidents who attained greatness through compromise. There's . . . uh . . . well . . . I mean . . . you know . . . Okay, look at the flip side of the question. Consider the great Presidents. George Washington, who lost 7 of the 9 major battles he fought in the American Revolution, didn't compromise with the British. Abraham Lincoln, who dallied initially with compromise until the Confederates digitally and martially expressed their views, became the great non-Compromisor who rid America of the curse of slavery. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, greatest President of the 20th Century, allowed Republican leaders as much input into the New Deal as Mozart had into Jailhouse Rock. Let us recall the great proponents of compromise in America's history: Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and John C. Calhoun. Their accomplishments as progenitors of accommodation are known to as many as 26% of all high school students for a period of time not exceeding 36 hours before and 2.14 minutes after exam time. This is a desirable legacy? Well, maybe in the eyes of some, but, please, not at the expense of those least able to bear that expense.
The Chained CPI would also increase taxes. Tax brackets and certain other features of the tax system are adjusted for inflation. If the adjustment is smaller, as it would be with the Chained CPI, the effect would be to raise taxes. As with Social Security benefits, the tax increases would fall most heavily on those at the lowest income levels (who otherwise are taxed lightly).
If you're wondering if implementation of the Chained CPI would affect you, the answer is yes. It affects everyone, although the well-off would suffer the least in relative terms. The likelihood of the adoption of the Chained CPI is difficult to predict. Conservatives and many moderates generally like the idea, although the white Boomers at the heart of the Republican Party will sooner or later figure out that they would take a bullet for their party's ideology from the Chained CPI. When they do, we'll find out if there's a cure for stupid.
Anyway, how could you counter the impact of the Chained CPI, if it's adopted? Save more. Start saving more now, and save more every month. It's hard to estimate how much more, because the answer would depend heavily on the specifics of your financial situation. But a rough guesstimate might be 1% of your income or a bit more if you're in your 20s or 30s, 2% for those in their 40s, and 3-4% if you've reached the Big 5-0. This may not sound like much, but try doing it (remember, this amount would be in addition to other saving you should be doing for retirement). A lot of Americans can't. Those who fail should acquire a taste for dog food, because it looms in their futures.
President Obama may think that proposing the Chained CPI keeps federal spending at a relatively stimulative level in the near term future, to help pull the economy out of the Great Recession, while reducing long term spending to help control the deficit. But if rational Americans begin saving more to compensate for the lower benefits and higher taxes promised for their retirements, the near term impact of the Chained CPI would be to reduce consumption and retard recovery. And continuation of the Great Recession would prolong the large deficits we now have.
The President seems obsessed with attaining a Grand Compromise. He seems to think doing so will burnish his legacy. That's weird. Consider the Presidents who attained greatness through compromise. There's . . . uh . . . well . . . I mean . . . you know . . . Okay, look at the flip side of the question. Consider the great Presidents. George Washington, who lost 7 of the 9 major battles he fought in the American Revolution, didn't compromise with the British. Abraham Lincoln, who dallied initially with compromise until the Confederates digitally and martially expressed their views, became the great non-Compromisor who rid America of the curse of slavery. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, greatest President of the 20th Century, allowed Republican leaders as much input into the New Deal as Mozart had into Jailhouse Rock. Let us recall the great proponents of compromise in America's history: Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and John C. Calhoun. Their accomplishments as progenitors of accommodation are known to as many as 26% of all high school students for a period of time not exceeding 36 hours before and 2.14 minutes after exam time. This is a desirable legacy? Well, maybe in the eyes of some, but, please, not at the expense of those least able to bear that expense.
Wednesday, April 3, 2013
The Beginning of the End For Facebook
Today (April 2, 2013), the SEC announced that public corporations can use social media such as Facebook and Twitter to announce information to investors. (See http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2013/2013-51.htm.) Now that Facebook has been given official recognition, it becomes irredeemably uncool. Who wants to spend time on a website where trends in product sales and revenue growth are disclosed? Or the latest in earnings per share? Yuck. Where's the fun in that? After all, social media sites are, above all, supposed to be fun. Now that Facebook is becoming a place where serious stuff is discussed, the fickle herd of young and highly mobile people crucial to the success of any social media website will get bored and look around for something that's more entertaining. Bye, bye, Facebook.
Monday, March 25, 2013
What's Wrong With The Cyprus Bailout
The draft proposal on the table to bail out Cyprus consists primarily of closing one bank--Popular Bank of Cyprus, also called Laiki Bank--transferring deposits of 100,000 Euros or less to another large bank called Bank of Cyprus, and freezing deposits exceeding 100,000 Euros. The frozen assets, which evidently amount to somewhat over 30 billion Euros, will be used to fund Cyprus' share of the cost of the bailout (5.8 billion Euros). How much frozen account holders will ultimately receive is unclear, since the funds for paying them out would have to come from bad assets of Laiki Bank--defaulted loans and the like. The hit they will sustain apparently could be large.
At first glance, this revised bailout appears not unlike bank liquidations as seen in the U.S. Account holders with insured deposits (i.e., at or below the $250,000 threshhold) are fully protected, and those holding excess balances are at risk, taking losses if the assets of the bank don't fully cover the nominal value of their accounts. But the Cyprus bailout is different.
The process by which Cyprus and the EU got to where they are today was one of political fits, false starts, near collapses and last minute expediency. The first proposed bailout included a levy on all deposits, a proposal which the Cypriot legislature roundly rejected. After scrambling futilely for assistance from Russia, the Cypriot government bowed to the stern diktat of the European Union that depositors be tapped. But both the EU and the Cypriot government wanted to protect insured deposits (those of 100,000 Euros or less), so the burden had to fall on deposits in excess of the insured amount. And because Laiki Bank is suspected to be the bank of choice for a supposed den of money launderers, tax evaders and other scoundrels, the blade fell on its large depositors. Large depositors at other banks were spared the guillotine.
What's missing is the due process of law. There isn't even a flimsy facade of legal due process. This isn't an ordinary liquidation of a troubled bank. Cyprus got into financial trouble, asked for a bailout, was told by the EU that a Cypriot contribution would be a prerequisite, and only then did Cyprus figure out who would pay the piper. The ultimate resolution is politically driven, not the result of the application of established legal procedures.
If the large depositors of Laiki Bank are iniquitous Russian oligarchs as some EU officials have hinted, one can't feel terribly sympathetic about their plight. Legality doesn't seem to have played much of a role in the way many wealthy Russians acquired their riches. But, ordinarily, modern nations seize property only in accordance with the rule of law. If a bank depositor isn't proven to be liable, for one lawful reason or another, then he or she shouldn't be deprived of property.
It wasn't Robin Hood, or even Jesse James, who absconded with the assets of large depositors of Laiki Bank. It was the sovereign governments of the European Union. When governments depart from the rule of law, capital will start exiting stage right. Large depositors in any EU nation that's financially shaky will likely behoove themselves to move their capital to safer places. The shaky countries may get shakier. The EU tries to present the Cyprus situation as a unique, one-time problem. But how many well-to-do depositors want to leave their money at risk, in case that's not true?
The EU will enjoy a near-term rebound from the Cyprus bailout. But longer term, it encounter trouble attracting the capital it badly needs to rebound from recession and fuel future growth. And it may well find that dealings with one of its major energy suppliers--Russia-- will take sharper tone. When the due process of law isn't applied, some people start thinking that might makes right. And that would be unfortunate for Europe, given the history of the last century.
At first glance, this revised bailout appears not unlike bank liquidations as seen in the U.S. Account holders with insured deposits (i.e., at or below the $250,000 threshhold) are fully protected, and those holding excess balances are at risk, taking losses if the assets of the bank don't fully cover the nominal value of their accounts. But the Cyprus bailout is different.
The process by which Cyprus and the EU got to where they are today was one of political fits, false starts, near collapses and last minute expediency. The first proposed bailout included a levy on all deposits, a proposal which the Cypriot legislature roundly rejected. After scrambling futilely for assistance from Russia, the Cypriot government bowed to the stern diktat of the European Union that depositors be tapped. But both the EU and the Cypriot government wanted to protect insured deposits (those of 100,000 Euros or less), so the burden had to fall on deposits in excess of the insured amount. And because Laiki Bank is suspected to be the bank of choice for a supposed den of money launderers, tax evaders and other scoundrels, the blade fell on its large depositors. Large depositors at other banks were spared the guillotine.
What's missing is the due process of law. There isn't even a flimsy facade of legal due process. This isn't an ordinary liquidation of a troubled bank. Cyprus got into financial trouble, asked for a bailout, was told by the EU that a Cypriot contribution would be a prerequisite, and only then did Cyprus figure out who would pay the piper. The ultimate resolution is politically driven, not the result of the application of established legal procedures.
If the large depositors of Laiki Bank are iniquitous Russian oligarchs as some EU officials have hinted, one can't feel terribly sympathetic about their plight. Legality doesn't seem to have played much of a role in the way many wealthy Russians acquired their riches. But, ordinarily, modern nations seize property only in accordance with the rule of law. If a bank depositor isn't proven to be liable, for one lawful reason or another, then he or she shouldn't be deprived of property.
It wasn't Robin Hood, or even Jesse James, who absconded with the assets of large depositors of Laiki Bank. It was the sovereign governments of the European Union. When governments depart from the rule of law, capital will start exiting stage right. Large depositors in any EU nation that's financially shaky will likely behoove themselves to move their capital to safer places. The shaky countries may get shakier. The EU tries to present the Cyprus situation as a unique, one-time problem. But how many well-to-do depositors want to leave their money at risk, in case that's not true?
The EU will enjoy a near-term rebound from the Cyprus bailout. But longer term, it encounter trouble attracting the capital it badly needs to rebound from recession and fuel future growth. And it may well find that dealings with one of its major energy suppliers--Russia-- will take sharper tone. When the due process of law isn't applied, some people start thinking that might makes right. And that would be unfortunate for Europe, given the history of the last century.
Tuesday, March 19, 2013
Why Republicans Are Trapped by Gerrymandering
Much of the Republican Party's power today is the result of legislative gerrymandering, the drawing of electoral districts in Rorschach test-like patterns to include majorities of reliably Republican voters. (See http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-19/republicans-win-congress-as-democrats-get-most-votes.html.) Thus, the Republicans now control the House of Representatives. But their gerrymandering has also trapped them in a time warp, and they are paying the price.
After last fall's loss of the Presidential election, Republicans are trying to figure out what went wrong in a contest they could have won. One of the key conclusions seems to be that a party of, by and for old white guys doesn't have much curb appeal for America's demographically changing populace. Many leading Republican voices now call for diversification. But that won't be easy, with their feet caught in the bear trap of their own gerrymandering.
Many Republicans politicians, particularly those inclined toward tea parties, are sworn to uphold and defend, even with their cold, dead hands if necessary, values that resonate primarily with old, white guys. If they start humming Kumbaya with anyone who doesn't party with tea, they'll be run out of office by people wielding old, white pitchforks. Let's be clear: if you represent a gerrymandered Republican district, you had damn well better look, sound and act like a Republican gerrymanderer. If you start to go wobbly, expect your constituents' footprints all over your caboose the next time you run for re-election.
The fact that many Republican politicians are beholden to a very narrow constituency now limits their options. It's a major reason why compromise in Washington is so difficult. Republican leaders in Congress have very little negotiating latitude, and can't engage in the swaps and accommodations that comprise political compromises. The upcoming deadlines--expiration of the federal government's funding on March 27 and the expiration of the debt ceiling on May 19--will probably be "resolved" with short term kicks of the can down the road. The Republicans appear to be taking more of the blame for federal dysfunction than the Democrats, and they may have limited their own ability to do anything about it.
Although Democrats have some problems with gerrymandered limits, they are much more tolerant of a diversity of views within their party. As the American populace diversifies, the flexibility of the Democratic Party could become perhaps its greatest asset, even while Republicans trash talk from their gerrymandered districts.
After last fall's loss of the Presidential election, Republicans are trying to figure out what went wrong in a contest they could have won. One of the key conclusions seems to be that a party of, by and for old white guys doesn't have much curb appeal for America's demographically changing populace. Many leading Republican voices now call for diversification. But that won't be easy, with their feet caught in the bear trap of their own gerrymandering.
Many Republicans politicians, particularly those inclined toward tea parties, are sworn to uphold and defend, even with their cold, dead hands if necessary, values that resonate primarily with old, white guys. If they start humming Kumbaya with anyone who doesn't party with tea, they'll be run out of office by people wielding old, white pitchforks. Let's be clear: if you represent a gerrymandered Republican district, you had damn well better look, sound and act like a Republican gerrymanderer. If you start to go wobbly, expect your constituents' footprints all over your caboose the next time you run for re-election.
The fact that many Republican politicians are beholden to a very narrow constituency now limits their options. It's a major reason why compromise in Washington is so difficult. Republican leaders in Congress have very little negotiating latitude, and can't engage in the swaps and accommodations that comprise political compromises. The upcoming deadlines--expiration of the federal government's funding on March 27 and the expiration of the debt ceiling on May 19--will probably be "resolved" with short term kicks of the can down the road. The Republicans appear to be taking more of the blame for federal dysfunction than the Democrats, and they may have limited their own ability to do anything about it.
Although Democrats have some problems with gerrymandered limits, they are much more tolerant of a diversity of views within their party. As the American populace diversifies, the flexibility of the Democratic Party could become perhaps its greatest asset, even while Republicans trash talk from their gerrymandered districts.
Monday, March 18, 2013
The Central Banks' Failure to Eliminate Risk
Now, it's Cyprus--tiny Cyprus, with 0.2% of the EU's GDP--that's shaking up the financial world. The Asian stock markets are falling on Monday, March 18, 2013, and stock futures indicate that the European and U.S. stock markets are also headed downward. Runs have already started at Cyprus' banks, and a bank holiday was declared for Monday, in order to stop the outflow of rats from the ship.
The proximate cause of the panic is a proposed EU bailout for Cyprus that includes taking from depositors at its banks 6.7% of deposits under 100,000 Euros, and 9.9% of deposits exceeding 100,000 Euros. Surprisingly, this tax (which is to help pay for the bailout) would hit small depositors that were supposed to be fully insured up to 100,000 Euros. The bailout violates a sacrosanct principle of bank regulation--that deposit insurance cannot be impaired. Deposit insurance is the key to depositor confidence, and the foundation of commercial banking. America's banking system recovered from the Great Depression (which saw thousands--yes, thousands--of bank failures) only when deposit insurance was instituted. If you scare depositors, an entire banking system can go belly up in less time than it takes to scramble a couple of eggs.
The powers that be which fashioned the Cyprus bailout--the EU, the European Central Bank and the IMF--imposed the depositor tax because of the somewhat shady doings of Cypriot banks. They extended the scope of their businesses way beyond their home island, accumulating assets amounting to twice the size of Cyprus' GDP. Reportedly, around half of their deposits are from Russians, and suspicions of money laundering, tax evasion, and other alleged shenanigans lurk. The stolid burghers of northern Europe have been wrinkling their noses over the unsavory aromas rising from Cyprus' banks, and they evidently view a tax on depositors as fair compensation for the trouble the EU is now being put to.
Whether or not the deposit tax is fair is, from a commercial standpoint, pretty much irrelevant. The financial markets thrive on confidence. The EU's financial crisis eased last summer when the head of the European Central Bank said, in substance if not words, that he would authorize the printing of money to prop up failing EU member nations. The bond vigilantes backed down. But the Cyprus bailout's tax on deposits is the opposite of money printing, and implies that losses are possible for holders of deposits in banks at other weak EU nations. There's nothing that shakes confidence like the prospect of losses, especially if one was supposed to be insured against them.
The financial markets have been coasting on a mellow buzz from toking up on central bank monetary accommodation. Ultra low interest rates and quantitative easing have taken the edge off volatility, and the markets seem to know no fear. But there is no way to eliminate financial risk. You can only transfer it somewhere. The Cypriots apparently wanted to transfer the risks and costs of their bankruptcy as far north as they could. But the folks up north didn't seem to cotton to that notion. So the risks and costs blew back, and as we now see, blowback can be nasty.
Who knows how this will all end. No doubt high ranking officials on both sides of the Atlantic are engaged, even as we write, in frantic discussions to figure out how to prevent the spread of financial contagion. The baseline problem is that the EU as a whole hasn't decided how to allocate the costs of resolving its financial crisis. This is probably a harder problem than the resolution of the U.S. government's current dysfunction, since, in Europe, people from disparate countries and cultures must somehow find common ground. Since these are the same people who fought two horrendous World Wars against each other in the 20th Century, it remains unclear if they will succeed.
In the meantime, remember that central bank monetary policy can provide a methadone high, at best. It won't last forever, and the aftermath may be a real downer. It's fine to feel good about the financial markets right now. But keep in mind that the central banks cannot eliminate financial risk, and if you relax your vigilance, risk could bite your left ankle in a flash.
The proximate cause of the panic is a proposed EU bailout for Cyprus that includes taking from depositors at its banks 6.7% of deposits under 100,000 Euros, and 9.9% of deposits exceeding 100,000 Euros. Surprisingly, this tax (which is to help pay for the bailout) would hit small depositors that were supposed to be fully insured up to 100,000 Euros. The bailout violates a sacrosanct principle of bank regulation--that deposit insurance cannot be impaired. Deposit insurance is the key to depositor confidence, and the foundation of commercial banking. America's banking system recovered from the Great Depression (which saw thousands--yes, thousands--of bank failures) only when deposit insurance was instituted. If you scare depositors, an entire banking system can go belly up in less time than it takes to scramble a couple of eggs.
The powers that be which fashioned the Cyprus bailout--the EU, the European Central Bank and the IMF--imposed the depositor tax because of the somewhat shady doings of Cypriot banks. They extended the scope of their businesses way beyond their home island, accumulating assets amounting to twice the size of Cyprus' GDP. Reportedly, around half of their deposits are from Russians, and suspicions of money laundering, tax evasion, and other alleged shenanigans lurk. The stolid burghers of northern Europe have been wrinkling their noses over the unsavory aromas rising from Cyprus' banks, and they evidently view a tax on depositors as fair compensation for the trouble the EU is now being put to.
Whether or not the deposit tax is fair is, from a commercial standpoint, pretty much irrelevant. The financial markets thrive on confidence. The EU's financial crisis eased last summer when the head of the European Central Bank said, in substance if not words, that he would authorize the printing of money to prop up failing EU member nations. The bond vigilantes backed down. But the Cyprus bailout's tax on deposits is the opposite of money printing, and implies that losses are possible for holders of deposits in banks at other weak EU nations. There's nothing that shakes confidence like the prospect of losses, especially if one was supposed to be insured against them.
The financial markets have been coasting on a mellow buzz from toking up on central bank monetary accommodation. Ultra low interest rates and quantitative easing have taken the edge off volatility, and the markets seem to know no fear. But there is no way to eliminate financial risk. You can only transfer it somewhere. The Cypriots apparently wanted to transfer the risks and costs of their bankruptcy as far north as they could. But the folks up north didn't seem to cotton to that notion. So the risks and costs blew back, and as we now see, blowback can be nasty.
Who knows how this will all end. No doubt high ranking officials on both sides of the Atlantic are engaged, even as we write, in frantic discussions to figure out how to prevent the spread of financial contagion. The baseline problem is that the EU as a whole hasn't decided how to allocate the costs of resolving its financial crisis. This is probably a harder problem than the resolution of the U.S. government's current dysfunction, since, in Europe, people from disparate countries and cultures must somehow find common ground. Since these are the same people who fought two horrendous World Wars against each other in the 20th Century, it remains unclear if they will succeed.
In the meantime, remember that central bank monetary policy can provide a methadone high, at best. It won't last forever, and the aftermath may be a real downer. It's fine to feel good about the financial markets right now. But keep in mind that the central banks cannot eliminate financial risk, and if you relax your vigilance, risk could bite your left ankle in a flash.
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